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REGULATORY REFORM IN A TIME OF
TRANSITION*
PETER L. STRAUSSt

As Americans have become both disheartened at the performance
of their governments and conscious of their penetration into what
were once private lives, regulatory reform has been urged with increasing fervor at both federal and state levels. Some of the reform
talk is lawyer's talk, some of it is directed to the most fundamental

aspects of the government order, and there is a good bit in between.
My purpose here is to examine a number of the directions being
suggested at the federal level for regulatory reform during the com-

ing decade. While it would be helpful also to consider state initiatives-many important measures,

like sunset legislation, have

originated in the states'-our time is limited, and my own experi* This article was delivered as the second Donahue Lecture, given at the Suffolk
University School of Law February 12, 1981. Inevitably, events will have overtaken
some part of the lecture by the time these materials are read. For example, President
Carter's Executive Order 12044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12661 (Mar. 24, 1978), referred to in the
text, was revoked by President Reagan on February 17th, 1981; a substitute
Executive Order, E.O. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 19, 1981), put into place for
the executive agencies mandatory cost-benefit analysis (where permitted by statute)
and required accounting for the impacts of government in a way clearly intended to
prepare for possible adoption of regulatory budget measures--both discussed within
as purely hypothetical measures. Some effort has been made to identify changes
subsequent~to the lecture, such as this one, for the reader to pursue. But it is the
nature of this subject to be a moving target, and a fully pleasing solution is thus not
to be found.
t Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law; General Counsel, United
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (an independent regulatory agency) 19751977; Consultant, American Bar Association Coordinating Group on Regulatory
Reform.
Colorado's sunset law went into effect on April 22, 1976. COLo. Rev. STAT. Tit. 24,
§ 34-104 (Supp. 1978); see FLA. REv. STAT. Tit. 1, § 11.61 (Supp. 1979). Note that
sunset legislation has not proved an uncritical success. See Pierce & Hagstrom, Is it
Time for the Sun to Set on Some State Sunset Laws? The National Journal, June
18, 1977, 937-39; With New Law Colorado Spends $212,000 to Abolish Three Agen-
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ence is almost wholly federal. So I offer you some thoughts about
federal regulatory reform-thoughts informed by a time in government service, the opportunity for academic reflection and the good
fortune to be in a position to observe the bar's efforts in this respect.
Let us start by discussing an important limit of our enterprise-both this enterprise of predicting the future and the enterprise of regulatory reform itself: we are not very good at telling the
future, at assessing the impact of today's choices on tomorrow's outcomes. Regulation increasingly involves the use of projections by
government about the impact of regulated activity or of regulation
itself-environmental impact statements, economic impact statements, regulatory flexibility statements, paperwork impact statements, perhaps even regulatory reform impact statements-to understand what impacts proposed changes would be likely to have.
Evidently this is a rational effort. Yet we would be deluding ourselves if we thought that those procedures offered much more than
some assurance that important topics had been thought about. We
may change a given institution or a law intending a certain effect,
and believing that that change will be useful to produce that effect;
yet certainly if we do not pay attention to the effects of a change on
the behavior of others, and even when we try to assess that impact,
the change will in itself produce new behavior and responses on the
part of government officials and members of society generally-responses and behavior impossible fully to anticipate. Perhaps
instruction can be drawn from the world of physical science. The
German physicist Werner Heisenberg is famous for his uncertainty
principle, the proposition that the precise position and velocity of an
electron can never be simultaneously determined.' The very fact of
measurement-the presence of an observer, the physical constraints
or apparatus necessary to locate the electron and/or measure its
speed-inevitably distorts what is being measured. So also in the
political affairs of human kind.
Our experience with a relatively mature reform illustrates the
point in a concrete way. When the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)s was put nearly into its current form in 1974, 4 it was said
that the changes would expose the workings of government to the

cies, N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1978.
THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 1217 (4th ed., 1975).
5 U.S.C. § 552. See generally W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATiVE LAW, 579-585 (1979).
4 Pub. L. No. 93-502, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552). The

8

legislative history has been compiled in a Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974 Source Book by the Subcomm. on Government Information Individual
Rights of the House Comm. on Government Operations (1975).
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public, and in doing so achieve an important political reform. The
accountability of government would be enhanced. The citizens
would have an opportunity to know what was going on behind the
closed doors of government, and indeed what information the government kept about the citizens in its files. That theme appears
again and again in the legislative history; there is no reason to doubt
the sincerity of those who professed it. And, it is fair to ask what
was seen of the possible, costs of that reform, and of the uses to
which the new provisions would be put.
Regarding costs, the projections of those who talked about the
1974 amendments when they still awaited passage have proved extremely poor. The House projected a cost for all government which
would not exceed $100,000.5 That may have been disingenuous; by
1974 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was already devoting the full-time work of seven employees to administration of the
Act.' But was it foreseen that by 1976 the number in that one
agency would be sixty-six, or by 1979, one hundred and twenty-nine,
at an annual expense for that one agency of almost four million
dollars?
The projections regarding use of the FOIA have proved no better.
It was said that the Act would provide a great resource for citizens
and newsmen to learn about the workings of government; but about
ninety percent of the thirty-two thousand FOIA requests received
by the FDA in 1979 seem to have come from businesses, private attorneys, and Freedom of Information service companies seeking
records on behalf of corporate clients, apparently to forward private
competitive purposes. It is only natural that, if the government has
information freely available which may be of commercial advantage,
it should be sought for that use. And that has been a major experience under the administration of the statute.
Although one might hypothesize that agency foot-dragging caused
the consumption of so many resources, the statistics suggest that the
administration of the FOIA has not necessarily been hostile. The
FDA reported that in 1979 it denied only about one and one half
percent of the requests it received. Nonetheless, the one hundred
twenty-nine employees out of seventy-five hundred who spent full
time on FOIA matters were one hundred and twenty-nine employees
at the FDA who were not working on the important problems on
controlling the safety and efficiency of drugs and the purity of foods
* H.R. REP. No. 876, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974).

' The data concerning the Food and Drug Administration in the text and in the
following paragraphs is derived from a series of charts produced by the FDA in conjunction with the 1979 Freedom of Information Act Annual Report by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
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on the American marketplace. Their numbers, obviously, multiply
across the face of American government.
If one looks to the impact of FOIA was expected to have, its influence on governmental affairs, some of the hopes of the enactors have
been gratifyingly realized. More information is available today about
government, and about the considerations which have entered into
important government decisions and activities. Yet these gains, too,
have their costs-costs hard to put numbers to, not clearly anticipated, yet nonetheless real. Government employees now know that
the memoranda they write to their superiors may be subject to disclosure, 7 and that brings about very natural and human changes in
the way in which those memoranda are written. Candor is compromised; possible exposures are defended against; matters are dealt
with informally to avoid leaving a paper trail which might subsequently be discovered (but which would have been useful for internal history or records). Those who deal with government from the
outside also seem to have become more reticent. Certain types of
information seem less likely to be shared freely with the government, based on expressions of concern-whether real or adventitious-that such sharing will inevitably produce revelation to competitors.8 With the ability of government to keep a confidence

Non-factual portions of intra-agency memoranda are exempt from mandatory
disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) of the Freedom of Information Act, but that
provision does not guarantee that they will be not disclosed. In order to obviate the
inevitable delays resulting from Freedom of Information Act litigation, and to avoid
the charge of suppressing unfavorable evidence, government lawyers now customarily
release unfavorable as well as favorable documentary evidence considered by agencies
in the course of rulemaking, including materials which it would be within the agency's
legal authority, if that were ultimately determined, to withhold. See Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 68-69, 82-83 .(1975); "Business Record Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act," hearings before the
Government Information and Individual Rights Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sesa. 75 (1977) (testimony of FDA
Commissioner Donald Kennedy).
8 Thus, at its 1981 mid-winter meeting, the American Bar Association adopted a
recommendation for enactment of legislative proposals to amend the Administrative
Procedure Act for a variety of purposes, including the purpose "to provide greater
protection for the confidentiality of information submitted pursuant to a compulsory
process." The supporting report, filed by the Association's Sections of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law and of Administrative Law, included the following
passages:
Companies are understandably reluctant to provide to an agency information
that can injure them competitively if it were released. While several of the exceptions of the Freedom of Information Act could be used by an agency to resist
disclosure of information. . . the full reach of the exceptions is not always clear
and the agency may not invoke them to resist the request for particular documents it believes are not covered. Thus, even when agencies enter into an agree-
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compromised, the likelihood that citizens will take government into
their confidence is also impaired.
Finally, the FOIA has contributed to the litigiousness of American
government in an apparently unintended way. Although its enactors
did not discuss its use, meant or merely incidental, as an instrument
of discovery against the government, the Act may be used, and regularly is used, to that end. 9 It provides a means for working out,
under judicial rather than agency supervision, and before the event,
what materials a rulemaking record will include on eventual review."0 More generally, lawyers may be able to use the Act to discover internal directions or interpretations, or factual data, which
can fuel argument about agency rationality or consistency, or the
weight to be attached to a profferred interpretation, or the appropriateness of a given investigation or other action." It may verge on
malpractice these days for an attorney whose client is engaged in
rulemaking or litigation with the federal government to fail to use
the Freedom of Information Act to seek the contents of relevant
government files. The more one knows of government processes the
easier it is to find occasions, real or contrived, for complaints about
them. Lawyers, well paid by clients to avoid the costly impact of
regulation often sincerely felt to be unwarranted or unjust, will be
diligent to identify those occasions. Judges, given new insights into
the workings of the administrative process by the files lawyers can
assemble using the Act, are not likely to deny themselves power to

ment not to release the information, the submitter has no guarantee that a court
will not require the agency to do so in a Freedom of Information Act suit....
These concerns apply to anyone who has submitted sensitive information to
the government, and . . . the risk of disclosure is particularly unfair when the
company is forced by compulsory process to disgorge the information. Moreover,
the risk of exposure surely leads to companies contesting some compulsory
processes they would otherwise accept....
See also the recommendations of the Committee on Federal Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 34 THE RECORD 612 (1979); Koch & Rubin,
A Proposal for a Comprehensive Restructuring of the Public Information System,
1979 DUKE L.J. 1; Stevenson, ProtectingBusiness Secrets Under the Freedom of Information Act, Managing Exemption Four (Monograph for the Administrative Conference of the United States, December 15, 1980).
1 "As a general rule, it is agreed that courts considering FOIA requests possess the
jurisdiction to enjoin agency proceedings pending disposition of an FOIA claim."
Note, Development under the Freedom of Information Act-1976, 1977 DuKE L.J.
555. But cf. Columbia Packing Co. v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 563 F.2d 495,
500 (1st Cir. 1977). And see Note, Restraint of Agency Proceedings under the Freedom of Information Act, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 191 (1975).
o See Pedersen, supra note 7, at 68-69, 82-83.
" E.g., Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666 (1981) (as discussed in Legal Times of Washington, March 16, 1981, p. 1).
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correct the apparent injustices thus revealed. Agency attorneys, noting the intensification of control, have insisted that their clients engage in more elaborate and conservative procedures, slowing to that
extent the process of decision. In rulemaking, for example, the
knowledge that judges will have records, along with other developments, has produced vastly expanded explanations of rulemaking
actions and rulemaking facts." And that, of course, does not address
the merely tactical possibility of distracting an adversary of limited
resources with massive information requests-a tactic of which the
government itself has sometimes been accused.
To note this impact is not to argue that the 1974 changes in the
FOIA should not have been made. I hold no brief for secret law, or
for agency action that must be taken on faith because the factual or
other basis for it is not exposed. Even government officials describe
the new thoroughness of agencies in justifying rules as having resulted in better, more thoughtful rules and easier compliance.' s The
point, rather, is that even though the step from exposure to expanded control was nearly inevitable, exposure, not expanded judicial control, was the stated rationale of the Act; the Act's contribution to a significant and widely noted intensification of judicial
control of agency action was not foreseen.1 4 And traveling the short
distance between increasing exposure of government, and enhancing
judicial control of its activities, has created not only these unanticipated benefits but also unexpected costs of reform.
The identical point could be made in countless settings. The
populists who brought us the Interstate Commerce Act did not appreciate that in protecting the farmer from rate-gouging by railroads
they were permitting the railroads to protect themselves from the
public and from competition;"5 nor did the railroads, when they
came to grasp these apparent advantages for themselves, see in
them the seeds of their eventual stultification.' The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for all its technical capacity and regulatory responsibility, has failed to anticipate those nuclear plant accidents
which have occurred-though doubtless many others have not occurred because of its effective prescience. Even when self-interest

:2
15

Pedersen, supra note 7, at 60.
Id., See also Cooper, Regulatory Reform? 35 FDC L.J. 193, 202 (1980).

See generally GELLHORN, BYSE & STRAuss, supra note 3, at 343-50, 372-81; Rogers, JudicialReview of Risk Assessments: The Role of Decision Theory in Unscrambling the Benzine Decision, 11 ENvTL. L. 301 (1981); DeLong, Informal Rulemaking
in the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REv. 257 (1979).
5 MrrNiCK, THE POLMcAL ECONOMY OF REGULATIONS, 173-91 (1980).
" Id. See also Caves, Christensen, and Swanson, The High Cost of Regulating U.S.

Railroads, REGULATION, Jan/Feb 1981, at 41.
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suggests assiduousness in anticipating the future consequences of
change, we are incapable of peering more than a few moves ahead.
With this limitation of vision in mind, let us turn now to ask what
the future might bring in the way of regulatory reform. We might
start by noting that those words can be used in at least three senses.
First, an in perhaps the largest sense, "regulatory reform" denotes
change in government structure-either in the power balance between the two political branches of government, President and Congress, or in the oversight mechanisms by which both legislature and
executive extend political controls over the regulatory agencies.
Such changes seem instinct in the high degree of dissatisfaction
many are expressing with government today, a dissatisfaction both
with the political system by which the people exercise their control,
and with the manner in which those they elect perform. Lloyd
Cutler, a distinguished Washington lawyer who recently served as
counsel to the President, is among those who have urged major constitutional change to permit more central control of government-amendments that would allow the President to dissolve the
Congress, lengthen congressional terms of office, and other like measures."' Others looking backwards rather than into the future, have
remarked how changes in the process of nomination and election to
the presidency and changes in the Congress have both reduced the
interdependence of those two bodies and impaired the coherence of
Congress as a legislative body. 8 Congressional staffs have been
growing far more rapidly than the White House,' and the two
groups are in vigorous competition for control over the decisions of
regulatory bodies.20 Unlikely as it is that the Constitution will be

'7 Cutler, To Form a Government, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol. 59, No. 1, at 126 (1980).
See also his earlier, influential article on presidential authority, Cutler & Johnson,
Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395 (1975). See also Sunquist,
Improving the Capacity to Govern, THE BROOKINGS BULLETIN, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall
1980).
18 Sunquist, supra note 17; Winter, The New Age of Political Reform: Looking
Back, 15 GA. L. REV. 1 (1980); for speculations on the changing (increasingly technological) nature of the decisions government must make, see John Kemeny's 1980
Compton Lecture at MIT, "Saving American Democracy: The Lessons of Three Mile

Island."
18 Between 1965 and 1979, paid civilian employment in the White House Office and
the Office of Management and Budget grew from 857 to 995. (The Counsel of Economic Advisers and National Security Counsel were responsible for an additional 84,
and 109 posts, respectively). During the same time, employment in the Congress grew
from 9,296 to 18,231. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, at 277 (100th Ed., 1979).
10 See, e.g., Bruff & Gellhorn, CongressionalControl of Administrative Regulation:
A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HAiv. L. REv. 1369 (1977); Henry, The Legislative
Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16 HARv. J. LEGIS. 735 (1979). The text
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amended to create a new structure of government, some types of
regulatory reform may be as deeply concerned with allocating power
within government as with changing the impact of government on

citizens and corporations."1
A second meaning for "regulatory reform", one especially important today, is the adoption of measures to reduce the impact of regulatory action-in the vernacular, to get government off the people's
back. In the largest sense, this involves legislative review and revision of substantive legislative programs. Individual programs may be

repealed or cut back, as with airlines deregulation; or so-called sunset laws may be used to bring into question the continuing need for
all agencies. Alternatively, the legislature may delegate the job of

review, like the job of regulation itself, to the agencies, to be carried
out under supervision. Environmental impact statements were an
early example of this kind of innovation; they require regulators to
engage in a prescribed course of inquiry into regulatory impact
before they may act in matters likely to be of significance to the
environment. More recently we have seen economic impact statements and regulatory analyses required by executive order;22 Con-

statement describes the general attitude of all presidents who had considered the
matter until President Reagan. See note 21 infra. The administration is challenging a
legislative veto in the Supreme Court, but in a special context involving executive
discretion rather than policy setting. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980)
(cert. granted.). A congressman may describe the legislative veto as merely a means
of assuring that the policymaking authority that Congress has vested in agencies is
used consistently with congressional purpose. But the President sees in the legislative
veto and the oversight which attends it a damaging competition for authority to execute the law, competition that impairs his capacity to govern.
" Scalia, Regulatory Reform-The Game Has Changed, REGULATION Jan./Feb.
1981, at 13. As these footnotes are written, there is no sign of recognition of Scalia's
perspective. Executive Order 12291 imposes substantially stricter controls on new
regulation than did E.O. 12044, and the Reagan White House, in a break with a tradition extending back to Woodrow Wilson's presidency, appears to be considering support of a general legislative veto if that would supplement but not displace presidential authority. See Henry, supra note 20; cf. New Regulation Reformer Puts
Bureaucratson Notice, Legal Times of Washington, March 16, 1981, at 8; Legislative
Vetoes Face Legal Attack, N.Y. Times, March 19, 1981. Partisan politics, too will
have its role. Some of the force behind conservative support for regulatory reform
measures, until last November, undoubtedly arose from the perception that added
procedures would slow or weaken a liberal presidency whose aims were suspect. With
a conservative in the White House, as Professor Antonin Scalia observes, the conservative congressman now may find it important to avoid imposing procedures which
could equally slow the executive branch in making changes of which the congressman
would approve.
22 The most general such requirements are those imposed by President Carter
in
Executive Order 12044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12661 (Mar. 24, 1978), and President Reagan's
Executive Order 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
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gress has just enacted similar requirements to assess the impacts of
certain rules on small business,2 8 and of government paperwork requirements on all businesses." ' And the future may hold requirements that these analyses not merely be made but be acted on-for
example, that the alternative least costly to the public be chosen, or
that a positive benefit be calculated before any regulation may be
adopted. " Further in the future are more dramatic proposals to create a regulatory budget, analogous to the appropriations budget,
limiting the costs a regulatory agency could impose on industry and
thus forcing it to set regulatory priorities to stay within its

allowance.2
Third, "regulatory reform" connotes changes in the procedures
which agencies employ in public decisionmaking. Such changes
might be made either for their own sake or as an indirect means of
slowing agency action or accomplishing some other such purpose.
Amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act 2 7 establishing
new forms of procedure, revising subpoena rules, changing the terms
under which Administrative Law Judges are employed, or altering

the standards for judicial review, were all considered by the Congress in its last session" and are under active consideration today."9

S3 The Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164, 5 U.S.C. §§
601-12.
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812, 44 U.S.C.
§§ 3501-20.
" See generally DeMuth, The White House Review Programs, REGULATION Jan./
Feb. 1980, at 13. President Reagan's Executive Order 12291, supra note 22, purports
to impose both of these requirements on all executive agencies in all rulemaking, and
adds as well the rerquirement that "regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize
the net benefits to society." See §§ 2(b), 2(c), (d). The Executive Order is discussed in
Rosenthal, Executive Order on Regulation Boosts OMB's Power, LEGAL TIME OF
WASHINGTON, March 16, 1981, at 14.
See generally DeMuth, The Regulatory Budget, REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 1980, at
29. E.O. 12291, supra note 22, prefigures these proposals by requiring agencies to "set
regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing the net aggregate benefits to society," (Section 2(e)), and authorizing the director of the Office of Management and
Budget to develop procedures for estimating aggregate annual costs and benefits of
regulations "for purposes of compiling a regulatory budget" (Section 6(a)(6)).
*7 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.
" The two principal bills in the Senate were S.262, originating in the Government
Affairs Committee (Ribicoff), and S.2147, originating in the Judiciary Committee
(Kennedy-Culver-Laxalt). The session ended before a proposal could be brought to
the floor. The two committees worked unsuccessfully for a compromise, reaching
agreement on many points, and each prepared a committee report at the end of the
session. Among the agreed items was that the bill should bear the number of Ribicoff
bill S.262. See S. REF. No. 96-1018 (pts. 1 & 2), 96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980). In the
House, the principal bill was H.R. 3263, which was reported and failed of adoption.
See H. R. REP. No. 96-1393, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980).
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We have, then, at least three different species of regulatory reform-changes in the large structure of government, reduction of
the impact of government, and changes in the procedure government employs in deciding regulatory issues. What follows is given
over to considering some of the possibilities for each of the three.
On the issue of structural change in government, my hope is to see
a movement from the anarchy of independent agencies to government action coordinated by the President. My belief is that the legal
sources which support independence have been considerably overstated, and that the President's role as chief executive implies a control capability which awaits reassertion. My fear is that congressional expectations about Congress' proper role, and the apparatus
Congress has built to carry that role out, will combine to defeat
movement in that necessary direction.
The question is nicely raised by President Reagan's directive
shortly after his inauguration to postpone the effectiveness of regulalations adopted in the final weeks of the Carter administration so
that they might be reconsidered."0 Where does his authority to give
such a direction come from? It is Congress which has conferred
rulemaking authority on the particular agencies involved, and it has
conferred the authority on them-not on President-to act according to public procedures which never mention a White House role,
though they may provide for legislative veto.31
Leaving to another place a detailed analysis,"3 let me state here
my judgment that support for the President's role lies in the constitutional scheme of tripartite government. The Constitution, without
significant elaboration, places on the President the responsibility to

2 E.g., H.R. 746, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., essentially the same bill as was approved
last year by the House Judiciary Committee; S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., like S. 262
in the last Congress, has been the focus of extended debate and negotiation between
the two principal Senate committees.
" Postponement of Pending Regulations, Memorandum of January 29, 1981, 46
Fed. Reg. 11227 (Sept. 6, 1981). The same questions are more emphatically raised,
and the same responses may be given, concerning E.O. 12291, supra note 22.
31 See Fleishman & Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem of PresidentialLegislation, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 1 (Summer 1976); Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and
Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 46
(Summer 1976); Note, JudicialReview of Executive Action and Domestic Affairs, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 1535 (1980).
3 See Strauss, Presidential Authority Over Regulatory Decisions, (unpublished
monograph for the Center for Law and Economic Studies, October 23rd, 1980). In
connection with E.O. 12291, the White House released a memorandum of Law from
the Department of Justice, dated February 13, 1981, relying heavily on the Supreme
Court's decision in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), to support the presidential role defined by that order.
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"take care that the laws be faithfully executed""-all of the laws,
not some of them-and then is strikingly silent on the question how
this responsibility shall be carried out, what shall be the structure of
executive government. This silence has been taken, and I think
rightly, to reflect a congressional role in shaping the executive
branch and a large measure of flexibility in the way in which that
role is exercised. " Congress can establish departments or agencies; it
can place responsibility in the President, his subordinates, or socalled independent commissions. But it would be error, given the
general framework of the Constitution, to find no limits on the congressional role.
One means of approaching the question of limitation is to ask
whether Congress can provide for law-execution placed beyond presidential direction, beyond a capacity in the White House to assure
faithful execution. The answer to that question is not obvious. Pursued to their limits, even undoubted congressional powers, for example, the power to set the White House budget, could be exercised to
destroy the presidency."5 Undoubtedly the drafters of the Constitution contemplated that political rather than legal forces would operate to keep the two more dangerous branches of government in
rough equilibrium."s Nonetheless, the current Supreme Court view
on separation of powers issues, sound in my judgment, is that there
exist central functions of each branch of government which the
others may not constitutionally invade.8 7 A fundamental choice of
the framers of the Constitution was that there should be only a single executive, politically responsible for the faithful execution of all
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
"E.g., Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524, 610 (1837); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803). See generally E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICES
AND POWERS 1787-1957 (1957); Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76
COLUM L. REv. 371 (1976).
1 "My classes think I am trying to be funny when I say that, by simple majorities,
Congress could at the start of any fiscal biennium reduce the President's staff to one
secretary for answering social correspondence, and that, by two-third's majorities,
Congress could put the White House up at auction. But I am not trying to be funny;

these things are literally true ....
Black, The Working Balance of the American
Political Departments, 1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 15 (1974), cited in Ledowitz, The
Uncertain Power of the President to Execute the Laws, 46 TENN. L. REV. 757, 802
n.197 (1979).
" See Bruff, PresidentialPower in Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451,
467-68 (1979), (quoting the Federalist No. 48). See also CORWIN, supra note 34; A.
SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS, ch. 1
(1976); Levi, supra n.34.
" Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). See also

Buckley v. Vaeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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laws.38 And so it would seem that Congress could not prohibit him
from counselling with the agencies it established regarding the execution of the laws. Congress could not, in other words, establish a
multi-headed executive.
While this is a very summary argument, two related objections
should be stated and considered. Does the argument for the fundamentality of Presidential oversight imply that the President must be
able to reach into each agency and direct how it will decide even
adjudicated cases, decided on the record after agency trial? Adjudication is, no less than rulemaking, a common agency function undertaken, in some sense in execution of the law. Yet we instinctively
rebel against presidential dictation of results. And, second, has the
argument not been precluded by Supreme Court decisions holding
that the President could not fire a member of an independent regulatory commission? These cases might be taken to show that Congress can withhold from the President control over a law executing
body.
In my judgment the Supreme Court decisions do establish that
Congress can require certain functions of government to be free of
political controls-its own as well as the President's-and this suffices to answer the first question in the negative. The context of onthe-record decision plainly is one from which politics may, even
must, be abstracted. But it does not follow that Congress can withhold political controls over agencies in settings in which objectivity
of decision is less central, or in which Congress retains political controls of its own. And examination of the cases generally thought to
support the second of the propositions stated above reveals no such
broad holding. The source of the conventional learning is a case
known as Humphrey's Executor v. United States39-decided at the
" A convention early defeated the proposal of Roger Sherman, who believed that
the executive should be subsidiary to the legislature, whose members "were the best
judges of the business which ought to be done by the Executive Department, and
[T]he
consequently of the number necessary from time to time for doing it ....
legislature should be at liberty to appoint one or more as experience might dictate."
M. FERRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (1911), I, 65. And see CORWIN,
supra n.34.
-' 295 U.S. 602 (1935). Humphrey's Executor was a unanimous opinion distinguishing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), a case which has consistently
been the primary source of Department of Justice claims for presidential authority.
See note 32 supra. Myers involved the firing of a postmaster, clearly an executive
functionary; and in distinguishing the case in Humphrey's Executor, the Supreme
Court used language which has supported broad assertions about the independence
from executive control of "independent Regulatory Commissions." 295 U.S. at 628.
That language was premised in a view of the separation of powers doctrine as dividing the government into three "air-tight departments," long since repudiated. See
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). In any event, as

19811

REGULATORY REFORM

height of the nine old men's resistance to Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's New Deal.40 On his election, FDR had sought to remove
a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission in the face of a
statute conferring a fixed term appointment, and limiting removal to
cause. The Court found that Congress could impose a "cause" requirement, but the Court did not have to say what that "cause"
would be. The dispute was framed in the baldest terms. Commissioner Humphrey was a Republican, a friend of big business who
had frequently cast a deciding vote for leniency in the FTC's councils. The President gave him no particular directive or asked no advice; he did not, perceiving insubordination, direct him to leave. His
request for Humphrey's resignation was founded not in breach of
discipline but failure of trust. Consequently, the Court found only
that Congress could legitimately insist that a Federal Trade Commissioner serve on terms other than those of a personal advisor. It
did not have to say whether the President could give the FTC Commissioners binding directives, or if so of what sort, or what might be
the consequence of any failure of theirs to honor such directives. 41,
The Court's reasoning, moreover, suggests that a substantial basis
for its holding was the conclusion that constitutional fairness required that important FTC actions be removed from all political
controls, not merely the president's. 42 As the Court described the

FTC's functions, they were threefold:
(1) The FTC could direct cessation of unfair methods of competition in commerce, after full-dress adjudicatory hearings;
(2) It could conduct investigations culminating in a report to the
Congress with recommendations for legislation;4 3 and
(3) It could act "as a master in chancery" in antitrust suits
brought by the Attorney General and referred to it by a district
court."

Assurance of impartiality and the absence of political controls of
is developed in the text, the language was wholly unnecessary to explain the holding.
40

The case was decided on the same day as Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United

States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).

E.

REDFORD, THE PRESIDENT AND THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS

(1960).

Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), involving the War Claims Commission, underscores the point. "The nature of the function that Congress vested in the
War Claims Commission"-to adjudicate according to law-is "the most reliable factor for drawing an inference regarding the President's power of removal." See also
BRUFF, supra note 36, at 499 (1979).
4" The brief which Humphrey's executor filed with the Court, indicated that more
than fifty percent of the FTC's budget was spent for this function.
,4The Court noted another provision of the Act authorizing the President to require certain reports, but characterized that provision as "obviously collateral to the
main design of the Act." Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 628.
42
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any character are centrally important to one part of this legislative
scheme, and providing information-gathering service to Congress,
not the President, characterizes the remainder. So far as the Court
was educated to the Commission's functions, the FTC did nothing
on which unified policy direction was even arguably relevant; and it
is in this sense-not a modern appreciation of the FTC's authority-that one must understand the Court's remark that "such a
body cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or an
eye of the executive."" 5 The chief concern was with the need for impartiality and, in particular, judicial impartiality:
The Solicitor General, at the bar,. . . with commendable candor agreed
that his view ... necessitated a like view in respect to the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the Court of Claims. We are thus confronted with the serious question whether ... the judges of the Legislative Court of Claims, exercising judicial power, continue in office only
at the pleasure of the President."
The balance of advantage between Congress and the White House in
overseeing the day-to-day functioning of political government is
thus irrelevant to the case. The apolitical character of the judgments
to be reached, 7 and the constitutional appropriateness, if not necessity of assigning such judgments to an apolitical process, fully explain the result.
We can return now, briefly, to President Reagan's directive.
Rulemaking, unlike adjudication, remains a political function-one
in which Congress does not hesitate to intrude, for example by the
legislative veto and by the strident intercessions of committee staff
which easily precede the exercise of a legislative veto. If rulemaking
is not to be excluded from politics, and is concerned with the execution of the laws, then in my judgment it is an activity which must be
regarded as being in some respects within the President's reach. And
a general, public directive to postpone the effective date of all rules
of a stated character presents few significant problems. Directives
that agencies follow stated modes of analysis or even take into account stated factors in agency rulemaking, to the extent permitted
by law, seem equally within the authority of central executive
oversight.
More difficult issues are presented by the idea, given currency by

45Id.

" Id. at 629. Recall the ease with which Chief Justice Marshall had upheld a similar restriction in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 167.
'7 Note that Congress, too, is disabled from interference in judgments of this character. E.g., Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1966). See Strauss, Disqualification of Decisional Officials in Rulemaking, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 990, 1018-27 (1980).
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the American Bar Association's (ABA) Commission on Law and the
Economy, that the President should be entitled to overrule specific
agency decisions on the merits in a limited number of rulemakings
of particular importance. "8 Perhaps here it is sufficient to note that
the idea has a very limited legislative future. Congress will resist,
seeing in it an enhancement of presidential authority. The President
will not press, since in practical terms it is not an enhancement.
Within the executive branch with certainty, and even within the independent agencies, he can wield a substantial measure of influence
over particular policy outcomes through the informal techniques of
telephone conversations and informal conferences. The ABA proposal will require public memoranda, invite judicial review, and inevitably suggest new formalities which will burden rather than ease the
tasks of government.' And, finally, the public will be concerned that
political control means special interest control through the back
doors of the White House-that government not visible will be government that is, if not corrupt, at least tainted by moneyed
interests.5"
Because the agencies have both the resources and the legal responsibility for policy-making, it is at the agency level that actual
decision-as against delay, clearance, or cajoling-should be taken.
Nonetheless, you can count me among those who believe that a
strengthening of presidential oversight and control of government-a reunification of executive government in the executive
branch-is required if government is to be brought under control.
The vastness of government itself is one reason why control is so
difficult. Any experience with large organizations demonstrates the
inevitable layering, internal politics, and diffuseness of responsibility
and response that size brings. But surely another reason for the dif4 COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM,

ch. V., Recommendation 3 (1979). A similar proposal earlier appeared in Cutler &
Johnson, supra note 17.
4
Executive Order 12291 approaches the ABA proposal, in its imposition of costbenefit analysis (where permitted by law) and additional requirements that benefits
be maximized and costs minimized. It goes beyond merely requiring the consideration
of costs and benefits where permissible, to making them a determinative factor-and
emphatically so. A court could easily believe this does substitute the President's judgment, on a matter sufficiently controversial and uncertain to require Congress to
speak to the issue. Be that as it may, it may be noted that the President chose not to
burden his new directive with formalities of public memoranda or participation, and
purported to exclude judicial review. Whether in so ordering he acted lawfully, is a
story for another day.
50 See, for example, the eloquent dissents of former Secretary of Transportation
William Coleman, Jr., and Elliot Bredhoff to the Commission on Law and the Economy report. Id. at 155 and 144.
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ficulty of coordinating modern government lies in Congress's predilection for placing government programs in the charge of limited
purpose agencies, which may have neither the inclination nor the
capacity to take into account all considerations bearing on a given
problem; and which may even be in sharp competition among themselves in regulating any given industry or activity. Sometimes, of
course, this is intentionally done-we may not want an agency concerned with food safety to worry about economics"'-and sometimes
it has overtones of the larger political struggles of which I have spoken. Yet viewed from the perspective of the single steel company
which must respond to dozens of federal regulatory programs, the
resulting melange may contribute even more than the regulatory
ends themselves to a sense of overburden. A White House charged
with seeing to the faithful execution of all the laws of the United
States surely has as one of its necessary functions the coordination
of government regulation to reduce, if not wholly avoid, this confusion of cross purposes s2
Some useful steps have been taken recently in the direction of
recognizing and implementing the President's coordinative role.
President Carter's Executive Order 12044" was a long overdue and
apparently successful assertion of presidential authority over some
aspects of rulemaking, at least within the executive branch agencies.
His Regulatory Council and Regulatory Analysis Review Group effectively promoted foreknowledge and thoughtful analysis of regulatory impact and alternatives." The Civil Service Reform Act"
placed in White House hands somewhat greater controls over the
performance of senior civil servants. In passing the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980," Congress too seemed to recognize-as it has
not always recently-the importance of placing coordinative roles
within the White House. Under that statute, the Office of Management and Budget now enjoys authority throughout government to
oversee the imposition and administration of programmatic information demands.' Finally, President Reagan's recent designation of a

" Cf. EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 295 (1980).
"' See, e.g., Joint Economic Committee, "An Inquiry Into Conflicting and Duplicative Regulatory Requirements Affecting Selected Industries and Sectors," Joint Committee Print, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. (July 31, 1980); United States Regulatory Council,
Report from the Director (July 1980).
'3 43 Fed. Reg. 12661 (Mar. 24, 1978).
" See, e.g., United States Regulatory Council, Regulating with Commonsense: A
Progress Report on Innovative Regulatory Techniques (October 1980).
'" Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1121, 5 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.
" Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq.
57 94 Stat. 2815-16, 44 U.S.C. § 3504.
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Task Force on Regulatory Relief 8 points in the same direction-although it, too, sidesteps the independent agencies.
While these steps are promising, Congress seems unlikely to put
large authority in the President's hands. It is not just that a Democratic House of Representatives may balk at recognition of a Republican President's claim for increased authority. Beyond party politics are the realities of fragmented congressional politics.
Congressmen are individuals, not members of a disciplined party
structure; they are elected as much on their individual reputation
and performance of service to constituents as on the basis of party
affiliation. And one result is that the congressional relationship with
regulators appears about as fragmented from the regulatory perspective as does regulation from the vantage of the regulated. Just as the
proposed Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant5 9 must be cleared with the
NRC, the EPA, the FERC, FEMB, OSHA, and more-to mention
only the more important federal agencies-the NRC must respond
to congressional oversight from ten different committees.6 0 The ma-

See Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 17, no. 4, at 33. The
Task Force, chaired by the Vice President, is given supervisory authority over the
Director of OMB for purposes of carrying out Executive Order 12291.
Several of the responsibilities given the Director under E.O. 12291 seem strictly
coordinative-oversight measures which respect agency decisional authority and thus
do not raise the same questions as might be raised with respect to the order's imposition of mandatory cost benefit analysis. See note 49 supra. Thus, under Section
6(a)(5), the Director is to "identify duplicative, overlapping and conflicting rules...
inconsistent with the policies underlying statutes governing agencies other than the
issuing agency or with the purposes of this order, and, in each such case, require
appropriate interagency consultation to minimize or eliminate such duplication, overlap, or conflict;" section 6(a)(3) permits him to "require an agency to obtain and evaluate, in connection with the regulation, any additional relevant data from any appropriate source;" and section 3 imposes requirements of regulatory impact analysis
rather similar to those which had been required by E.O. 12044.
59 Cf. NHPS Co. v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1978); Seacoast Anti-Pollution
League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 94; STEVEN,
SEABROOK AND THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Ch. 7 (1980).
" In the Senate, the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation of the Committee on
Environment and Public Works; the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development of the Committee on Appropriations; the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear
Proliferation and Government Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs;
and the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment of the Committee on Foreign Relations. In the House, the Subcommittee on
Energy and the Environment of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs; the
Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce; the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development to the Committee
on Appropriations; the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy and Natural Resources of the Committee on Government Operations; the Subcommittee on Internal
Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production of the Committee on Science and
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jority-and minority-,congressmen in each of these committees do
not represent a single or coordinated point of view. Each may be in
pursuit of power in Washington and headlines or approval at home,
and those tend to b6 won by burgeoning staffs, vigorous oversight,
competitively with other committees and without necessary attention to party ends. Of course some congressmen take a longer view;
obviously there are limits on even a well-staffed committee's ability
to engage. in oversight; and public benefits derive from a regulator's
understanding that it too will be held accountable. The point here is
a limited one-the future is unlikely to bring a reduction in the
amount of time congressional committees spend looking over the
shoulders of agencies, or in the diversity of oversight demands which
regulators experience. The result is likely to be somewhat distracting from the business at hand-sometimes intended, sometimes
beneficial; it is likely to be productive of conflict rather than coordination; and thus it is most unlikely to produce additions to presidential authority or any other form of central direction.
An illustration can be found in the three competing regulatory reform bills introduced during the last Congress,"' and which seem
likely again to be prominent .during the coming Congress. The three
bills were remarkably similar in substance. The major reform in
each, putting aside some procedural changes, was to be a requirement that agencies carefully analyze the economic consequences of
proposed policy changes through an impact statement procedure
rather like that now employed for assessing environmental impact.
One sharp difference among the bills as first introduced, the one to
be noted here, lay in their differing provisions for supervision of this
function.2 Under one bill, supervision was to lie in a congressional
oversight agency, whose functions and powers were richly defined. A
second bill described with equal elaboration a new regulatory agency
to assume: the function-a regulatory agency located outside the executive office and controlled by regulators as much as by the President. 3 Only the third placed the function in a presidential office,

Technology.
61 See note 28 supra.
6 S. 262 at one time provided for review by the Congressional Budget Office; a
later version proposed to divide oversight authority among the Controller General of
the United States (a congressional functionary), a new Federal Regulatory Council
outside the Executive Office, and the Office of Management and Budget. Committee
Print of April 15, 1980, at 8-10, 82-84, 96-99.
63 The Senate Judiciary Bill, S. 2147, proposed establishment of a Regulatory Policy Board, outside the White House. Committee Print of December 18, 1979 at p. 8 if.
The negotiations between the Judiciary and Government Affairs Committees ultimately produced general agreement on an amalgam of these provisions. See note 28
supra. A Regulatory Council was established and charged with the general coordinat-
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the Office of Management and Budget, and in that bill the oversight
functions were minimally described, as if for fear that knowledge the
President was being empowered to oversee executive government
would persuade congressmen to make another choice." Politics as
usual? Of course. And
the point is that that has its consequence for
6
regulatory reform. 5
Let us turn now to the second of our species of regulatory reform,
the effort to reduce its impact. "Less government" is an easy slogan,
and it conceals a variety of possible aims. We need to be careful
about what it is we want, and how we believe it can be obtained.
For example, when the most recent appointee to the First Circuit
Court of Appeals, Judge Breyer, was a Harvard professor, he wrote
persuasively about "regulatory mismatch," by which he meant that
a contemporary evaluation of the needs for government, case by
case, would show in some cases that inefficient tools had been chosen to accomplish appropriate regulatory ends. 66 One could achieve
more efficient government-less of it-by more closely matching in
each case the ends it is to serve with the techniques it employs. It is
now widely believed, for example, that much economic regulation
67
could safely rely more on market forces than has been our habit.
Deregulation of the airlines has resulted from this insight, and the
vigorous price and service competition that resulted has produced at
least short term savings for many airlines passengers."
Relatedly, government may be reduced by eliminating regulatory
programs for which there is no longer a justifying need. Unquestionably regulatory programs outlive their usefulness, or become en-

ing role; the Office of Management and Budget was given responsibility for reviewing
agency success in implementing the regulatory analysis procedures; and the General
Accounting Office was charged with also conducting periodic audit of agency compliance with the regulatory analysis procedures. See SEN. REP. No. 96-1018, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., 31-34, 32-33.
" "The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall monitor and review
compliance by agencies with the requirements of this subchapter and shall establish
such procedures as may be necessary to ensure such compliance." Section 606, H.R.
3263. See H. REP. No. 96-1393, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. p. 88 (1980).
" The currently pending reform measures, (H.R. 746 and § 1080 in its two versions), each contain more explicit recognition of a presidential role, but subject to
substantial limitations. See note 29 supra.
Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure:Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547 (1979).
" See United States Regulatory Council, Regulating with Common Sense: A Progress Report on Innovative Regulatory Techniques (October 1980); American Enterprise Institute, Major Regulatory Initiatives During 1978-the Agencies, the Courts,
and the Congress (1978).
" Airlines Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-254, 92 Stat. 1744, 49 U.S.C. §
1551.
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crusted with techniques or requirements that do little but perpetuate the economic interests of a specialized bar or regulated group.
Attentive review of existing programs or regulations, case by case,
can be helpful in pruning away the dead wood of law generated to
deal with yesterday's problems. This work is neither romantic nor
dramatic in its impact across government as a whole; yet may be the
only effective route to substantive change.
Yet another promising technique for health and safety regulation,
the regulatory growth industry over the past ten years, involves
changing the manner in which regulations seek to achieve their purposes. To date, technological regulation has tended to use standards
which command and control. They tell the businessman exactly how
to build a safe ladder or what technology to employ to control pollution at each smokestack. Now, it is suggested that easier, cheaper,
and more effective regulation could be achieved by limiting it to informing the businessman what performance he must achieve and
leaving to him the devising of means for doing so.6 9 The idea is an
intriguing one; it builds on winning businessman's cooperation, on
giving the manager an incentive to meet regulatory purposes using
his own initiative rather than treating regulation as necessarily an
adversary relationship in which the regulated industry is always the
mischievous school-boy. It remains to see how well this scheme can
work in practice; enforcement, for example, will almost invariably be
more complex, and thereby will threaten the government's limited
70
capacities for accurate understanding.
Of course, some concerned with seeking less government are not

" See 5 U.S.C. § 622(d)(8), as proposed to be enacted in H.R. 3263, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 101(a) (1980), and H. REP. No. 96-1393, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-42 (1980);
COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM, 6062 (1979); UNITED STATES REGULATORY COUNCIL, REGULATING WITH COMMON SENSE: A
PROGRESS REPORT ON INNOVATIVE REGULATORY TECHNIQUES (October 1980); Breyer,
supra note 66 at 570-75.
70 Enforcement of a requirement that a certain type of ladder be used requires only
visual inspection to ascertain that the ladders are of the prescribed type. Enforcement of regulation that requires plant managers to assure that portable devices for
vertical movement of workers meet certain requirements of durability, strength, and
the like may require quite elaborate testing regimes. The more variation there can be
from site to site, the more complex will be the inspector's role-the more inspectors
may be required, the higher degree of education may be required of them, and so
forth. "Command" type regulation suits government in ways that are not merely selfserving-in making the performance of government roles easier, they also make it
fairer (less subject to arbitrary discrimination) and less subject to undetectable corruption. And they may render double a task which, theoretically, would better be
performed by less prescriptive means, but which cannot practicably be done in that
way because the resources necessary for effective administration simply could not be
found.

1981]

REGULATORY REFORM

only after the dead wood or inefficient technique. They also seek to
eliminate regulation of contemporary viability and effectiveness,
with the ends of which they disagree. That is politics; yet it is worth
remembering the sage advice of Herbert Kaufman that big government and its associated red tape are basically the product of public
demand.7' Save for the ineffective, the inefficient, or the superfluous,
giving up government will require us to resubmit to the evils we had
decided to prevent.72 Of course, reassessment might lead us to conclude that those evils, on mature reflection, look less threatening
than the government regime necessary to contain them. Much occupational regulation at the state and local level, one imagines, could
be dispensed with without significant harm to any but the entrenched practitioners of those occupations. But the reassessment
might also persuade us that corporate officials are still profit-maximizers, and will not spontaneously respect the quality of air and
water if they are permitted to treat those resources as free.

Two families of techniques are well defined and likely to see increasing use for the reassessment of regulation-periodic review and
impact analysis. The techniques of budgeting and workforce reduction (on which the President has indicated he means to rely) might
also be considered, although these techniques are less focused on
particular programs than on overall considerations of the size and

impact of the federal budget and of federal regulation as a-whole on
the economy. Their want of focus makes them more suitable for
broadscale slashing of government than particularistic pruning of individual programs.
Periodic review of existing regulation can occur either at the legis-

" H.

KAUFMAN, RED TAPE: ITS ORIGINS, USES AND ABUSES (1977).
" "Maybe we could suppress (red tape] if it were merely the nefarious work of a
small group of villains or if it were a waste product easily separated from the things
we want of government, but it is neither. Anyway, if we did do away with it, we would
be appalled by the resurgence of the evils and follies it currently prevents ....We
are ambivalent about the appropriate trade-offs between discretion and constraint,
each of us demanding the former for ourselves and the latter for our neighbors.
Under these conditions, learning to live with it is the only thing to do.
Learning to live with it does not mean accepting all its manifestations and worst
features, however. Rather, it means systematically laboring to minimize its net costs.
What we need is a detached clinical approach rather than heated attacks, the delicate
wielding of a scalpel rather than a furious flailing about with a meat axe.
Dealing with bits and pieces of the problem will not yield dramatic results. Indeed,
since there is little prospect of "break throughs, . . . since the world is growing more
complex and interdependent all the time, an inexorable increase must be expected in
the number of requirements in prohibitions with which we will have to put up. The
best we can hope for is that the rate of growth will be sufficiently controlled to allow
us to adjust to these additional irritants." H. KAUFMAN, supra note 71, at 97-98. See
also Gellhorn, Deregulation:Delight or Delusion? 24 ST. L.U.L.J 469 (1980).
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lative or the administrative level, and seems likely to be required at
both. At the legislative level, the competing modalities are described
by their proponents as sunset and high noon legislation. The basic
difference is evoked by the names-in sunset legislation the sun goes
down, and an agency which is not reauthorized on a periodic basis,
say every ten years, then ceases to exist.7 3 High noon legislation also
forces periodic reassessment, but emphasizes techniques for requiring legislative consideration rather than the continuing authority of
the agency. Thus, the consequences of failure to keep to schedule
are less dramatic; the agency may continue to function. 7 The high
noon model now appears to be prevailing in legislative consideration,71 sunset in its dramatic form seeming to be a kind of Russian
roulette with the public interest. 76 At the administrative level, agencies will probably face statutory obligations not only to cooperate in
periodic high noon review, but also to establish and follow an internal schedule for their own periodic reassessment of important bodies
77
of agency rules.
If all this seems so sensible you are incredulous that it is not already occurring, consider the problem of resources. Careful review of
existing programs and rules requires funds and manpower-that is,
diversion from other, generally more pressing and rewarding tasks.
To a certain extent, Congress can respond to this problem by providing additional resources-enlarging committee staff and providing additional personnel to the agencies. But now note how the effort to produce less government is generating more
government-and, to make matters worse, less effective government.
For whatever Congress can do about raw numbers in its committees
or in the agencies, it cannot expand the number of hours in the day

See, e.g.,
TO REFORM,

COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS

110-111 (1979); S. 2, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Cohen, Sunset Propos-

als in Congress-Sinking Below the Horizon? National Journal 1978, 1980 (Nov. 24,

1979).
71 See S. 2147, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Title Three (1979); S. BREYER, REGULATION
AND ITS REFORM (Harvard University Press).
75 See S. REP. No. 96-1018, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 39-43 (discussing
the High Noon
proposal as it had matured before the Senate Judiciary Committee to the end of the
last session).
76 Id. The problem is not only that occasionally there is the unanticipated and
unwanted sudden end of a useful life; the limited experience with sunset provisions
has been one of time consuming and expensive review followed by little or no change
in agency jurisdiction and authorization. See D. Avery, The Record on Sunset Review
of Two Agencies, in REFORMING REGULATION at 41 (T.B. Clark et al 1980).
7' All three regulatory reform bills seriously considered during the last session of
Congress included such a provision; it was included as part of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, supra note 23, 5 U.S.C. § 610. Section 3(i) of E.O. 12291, supra note 22,
imposes a periodic review regime for executive agencies.
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of the congressman or agency heads who must supervise these and
other activities. And so they necessarily become distracted from
other business or their general performance of function becomes
more diffuse.
The second family of techniques now being actively pursued for
controlling the impact of government is that of impact analysis. The
elder son of this family is, of course, the environmental impact
statement-a device which may have been intended as much to promote regulation as to inhibit it. The idea was to get the government
to think ahead about the probable impact of its actions on the environment, and then to take steps to avoid that impact. It has produced elaborate investigations, lengthy hearings, and more complex
regimes of action-i.e., more government and more cost. Businessmen and Sierra Club members may debate the worth of these inquiries while in my judgment they have been worthwhile, they have
also made decisions more complex, more sluggish, more exposed to
the hazards of litigation, and more costly-both to government and
to those who must deal with the inflationary consequences of
7
delayed investment. 8
The environmental impact statement is the product of a valid insight about a failure of the economic market, that investors or managers will not spontaneously think about the impact of their activities on public goods, such as air and water, for which they do not
have to pay and the valuation of which is not obvious. A structure to
require businessmen to think publicly about these impacts, and perhaps act on their thinking, has evidente benefits as well as costs.
The insight can be extended. We are now coming to realize that for
governmental officials, getting information from the business community, and imposing the costs of responding to regulations, are

"

"[E]xtensive litigation has occurred on Environmental Impact Statements (EIS)
prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. In the first five
years of that program, some 654 court cases were brought which raised an EIS is-

sue-and many of those cases took years to resolve. The EIS requirement is the only
other, government-wide economic analysis now mandated by statute. In that regard,
it is interesting to note that when Congress considered that bill, almost no attention
was given to the judicial review question.... The Committee has carefully considered

this issue and struck a delicate balance. The Committee believes, as a matter of policy, that the findings, adequacy and methods of the regulatory analysis should not be
subject to judicial review. That course would not be in the public interest. It would
mean more delay, possibly more opportunity for obstructing regulatory policy, and

decrease usefulness of the analysis for the agencies and the public." S. REP. No. 961018, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, 28 (1980). These words were written in connection with
the Senate Committee on Government Affairs' version of the Regulatory Reform Bill,
S. 262. Similar judgments were reflected, but not as fully explained in the two other
major regulatory reform bills, S. 2147 and H.R. 3263, the Regulation Flexibility Act, 5
U.S.C. § 611, and the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3504(h)(9).
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much as air and water may be to manufacturers-an apparently free
good which will not spontaneously be valued or accounted for in
making decisions.
Following the environmental impact statement model, the Congress last term enacted both the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980. The former requires the assessment of regulatory impact on small businesses and an accommodation to their special needs and vulnerability; 9 the latter act requires
similar assessments for proposed informational requirements and
creates a structure for oversight and coordination within the executive branch to assure the accomplishment of the Act's goals.80 These
statutes will be put into effect this year, and it seems probable as
well that we will see a statutory requirement for analysis of the impact of major rules, following the lines of President Carter's Executive Order 12044. 81
In my judgment, these can be valuable reforms, but Congress and
the President need to be sensitively aware of their own impact, individually and overall, on regulatory processes and government costs.
One sign of such awareness lies in the apparent willingness of the
reformers to leave enforcement of the reforms to the political process, and thus to preclude judicial review.82 Compliance with the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act or regulatory impact
analysis under the draft legislation is unlike compliance with environmental impact analysis requirements in that the newer requirements cannot be enforced in court. 8 That will reduce if not eliminate adventitious stirring up of secondary controversy or delay, but
at the possible cost of generating cynicism about the requirements.
In any event, resourceful attorneys can certainly be expected to do
what they can to put these issues before the courts.
The possible impact of such regimes on government itself can be
illustratied by proposals to require the analyses to be performed
within the agency itself, rather than by government contractors."

'9 Pub.

L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164, 5 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.
" Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq (1980); see Neustadt,

Taming the Paper Tiger, REGULATION, Jan./Feb. 1981, at 28.
11 See DeMuth, The White House Review Program, REGULATION, Jan/Feb 1980, at
13; note 29 supra; E.O. 12291, supra note 22.
82 See note 78 supra.
93

Id.

84

See, e.g., H.R. 3263, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Section 603 (1980). The accompanying

report, H. REP. No. 96-1393, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 42 (1980) reflects a "growing
concern about the expanded use of contractual consultants and temporary employees
in the performance of governmental functions. These consultants and temporary employees are not subject to the financial disclosure requirements of the prohibitions on
post-government employment activities established by the Ethics in Government Act
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While such a measure would underscore the perceived importance of
the analysis, it will also produce a diffusion of effort, reducing government's resources for doing the main job set before it, unless the
agency's manpower is to be increased by whatever is required to perform the new functions. In this way, the proposals would import
business' complaint about government into government itself-that
so many requirements, and at times conflicting requirements, must
be met, and at such expense, that the efficiency required to carry
out fundamental tasks may be fatally impaired.
Quite different from impact analysis is what might be described as
the budgeting approach to regulatory reform-reducing the impact
of goverment by reducing the dollars or manpower committed to
government; or, as has also been suggested, by placing quasi-budgetary ceilings either on the overall costs that a given agency can impose on the economy, or on the costs that government as a whole
can place on a given industry. 8 The first two approaches-dollar
cuts and manpower cuts-are very much in the headlines; the regulatory budget idea is more coherent intellectually, although not coherent enought to achieve its proponents' aims without unwarranted
side effects.86

of 1978 .... The Committee is also concerned that an overreliance on contractors can
result in the failure to develop needed expertise within the regulatory agencies themselves. In a report entitled 'Improving Government Regulations, A Progress Report,'
issued in 1979 by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on the implementation of Executive Order 12044, OMB concluded ".... Some agencies have not developed the analytic talent needed to produce a regulatory analysis or to supervise contracts for such an analysis . . . since contractors often believe they are 'paid by the
pound' studies may be lengthy, detailed, and complex. These documents may be of
little or no help to policy makers because, although they provide important technical
details, they are not decision-oriented ..
"
" See "Regulatory Budgeting and the Need for Cost-Effectiveness in the Regulatory Process," Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, 96th Cong. 1st Sess
(1979); DeMuth, The Regulatory Budget, REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 1980, at 29;
Salamon, "The States and Regulatory Reform: A Political Analysis," (monograph for
the Center for Law and Economics, October 23rd, 1980, at 42-44); Stewart, "Commentary on 'Presidential Authority Over Regulatory Decisions,'" monograph for
Center on Law and Economic Studies, October 23, 1980, at 13.
"The great concern [about regulatory budget] on the part of advocates of social
regulation is the exclusive focus on costs in the regulatory budget concept, and the
total neglect of benefits. This would be bad enough if the costs were easy to compute.
But the costs that would have to be reflected in regulatory budget are estimates of
the costs that would be imposed on the private sector as a direct result of particular
regulatory action. The possibilities for miscounting, over-estimating, misallocating or
otherwise confusing these estimates are great indeed. Coupled with the lack of attention to benefits, the resulting over-estimation of regulatory costs could, in the eye of
the public interest community, set back the conscientious pursuit of regulatory goals
by decades." Salamon, supra note 85, at 44.
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Cuts in expenditures and reductions in personnel in regulatory
agencies can have little impact on the overall size of government or
its budget. Only a small proportion of the federal budget and the
federal work force is engaged in regulation as we usually think of it.
Ninety-one cents of every budget dollar goes for defense, grants, or
interest on the national debt. Nine cents pays for everything else.*
While paid civilian employment in government is about three million s (over one million even if defense and postal employees are
wholly discounted), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
employs barely 2,000 individuals;89 the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), a newer agency widely credited with inflationary impact, employs about 13,000.0 So also for the budget. The EPA
budget in 1980, excluding construction grants but including the
costs of administering them, was about one billion dollars;91 the SEC
budget the same year was less than seventy-five million dollars."
The national expenditures that year totaled almost six hundred billion dollars.9 "
Cuts in expenditures and personnel will, of course, have a major
impact on the amount of regulation agencies are able to achieve.
Cutting down the amount of regulation may be desirable; but one is
free to doubt whether this will always be done, in the President's
words, "with the most profound respect for that which must be preserved as well as with sensitive understanding and compassion for
those who must be protected."" Merely cutting numbers of dollars
and employees does not promise such compassion and rationality."
The impact of cuts or even freezes will be the more severe if the
Congress continues to add to, indeed does not reduce, the burden of
controls on the regulatory function. The same reasoning that produces alarm over the extent and uncoordinated character of business

87 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT-FISCAL YEAR 1982 (1981). Although the
document cited is the budget proposed by the Carter administration for the first year
of the Reagan administration (one that has been the subject of substantial revision in
the period following) the proportions are unlikely to have changed radically in the
process.

88 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES,

at 277 (100th Ed. 1979).

Id. at 278.
90 Id. at 279.
11

Budget, supra note 87, at 495-96.
Id. at 531.
93 Id. at 551.
9 N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1981 at A12, col. 6. The months following these presidential

remarks (and delivery of this lecture) have confirmed this fear.
95 Id.

19811

REGULATORY REFORM

regulation should evoke concern for the efficiency of that regulation
which must be preserved-whatever, on the merits, that turns out to
be. If protection of investors from fraud in the markets remains a
good idea, it should be efficient protection, not the erratic and haphazard regime that could result from weakening central direction or
doubling caseloads-both likely outcomes of budget cuts and staff
reductions at the SEC. Added controls over regulatory function will
produce the same effects, or compound them if cuts are also made.
When two hundred employees of the SEC's 2000 must spend their
time satisfying external control requirements-writing opinions or
answering congressmen or preparing impact analyses-only 1800 can
regulate securities fraud; if tomorrow 400 will be required, only 1600
can regulate. Moreover, new regulation regulatory measures have a
disproportionate impact at the very top of the agency. Since the
number of hours in a day is constant, the more time regulatory
heads must spend responding to outside controls, the less time they
have available to supervise and direct the work of their staffs. While
regulation of the regulators is called for; that, too, has costs as well
as benefits, and some forms are more rational than others. In particular, we need to recognize that requiring increased or even maintained expenditures for complex internal procedures forces budgetary cuts to be absorbed in the agency's substantive program. With a
cut that does not involve a judgment on the merits of a regulatory
program should come steps to permit regulators to pare elaborate
procedures and preserve to the extent possible their programmatic
charges. If the size of regulatory bodies is to be cut, the number of
extraneous demands on them must be cut as well.
In a storm, with capsizing imminent, the captain does not pause
for careful consideration of the possible future utility of each piece
of ballast before hurling it over the gunwales. That seems the dominant mood of the Reagan administration; and to that extent such
counsels as these must seem pitifully irrelevant. Slashing the budget
by fifty billion dollars is an end in itself and the long range consequences of the slashing are hardly to be considered. That is not my
subject here-but it does seem appropriate to insist that that is not
my subject, that that is not regulatory reform.
Apparently more responsible are proposals to step beyond regulatory impact analysis to a requirement that agencies choose the
"least costly alternative" or that they demonstrate that the costbenefit ratio for a regulation favors benefits." On a grander scale is
the proposal for a regulatory budget limiting the costs each agency

" See DeMuth, supra note 81. These "proposals" were in fact made binding on
executive agencies by E.O. 12291.
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can impose on private industry in a given year and thus forcing
agencies to set priorities among possible activities. Another form of
regulatory budget would limit the regulatory costs government as a
whole could impose on particular industries, requiring coordination
97
and priority setting within government to that end.
Although these proposals are seductive, in my judgment theirs is
the seduction off Delilah. The result again will be more government,
not less of it, greater complexity in public affairs and enhanced litigiousness. The courts have resisted enforcing cost-benefit outcomes
in connection with environmental impact anlayses ostensibly because of the complexity of litigation over the accounting involved."
One can imagine a deeper reason. One involved in health and safety
regulation quickly comes to understand that fundamental values are
involved in any such assessment, values which politicians are unwilling to assess directly. The best example is the value of human life.
One can hardly decide whether a given environmental regulation is
cost-beneficial, even if the complex accounting of costs, injuries
avoided, and the like are accomplished, without knowing how much
society would willingly pay for the saving of one or twenty-three
lives. On responses to that question we are and undoubtedly will
remain irrational; a few hostages or trapped miners will always attract proportionately greater voluntary commitments of resources
than thousands of elderly citizens suffering from bronchitis or emphysema. As long as our responses do remain irrational the notion
that cost-benefit analysis can produce clear answers to regulatory issues remains irrational along with them. Certainly impact analysis
can produce a focusing of issues, and understanding of the dimensions of choice, even a comparison among competing alternatives. It
seems a further step to require action on the basis of cost-benefit
calculations and congress cannot do that while simultaneously ducking without perpetrating a fraud. 9
The regulatory budget, too, has sound impulses. Plainly enough
the impact of EPA or OSHA on the economy is not to be measured
only by its own budget. The rules of any agency require spending in
the private sector, and that can produce a more significant im-

See note 85 supra.
" E.g., AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979); ROGERS, ENERGY AND
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW-CASES AND MATERIALS 245 (1979).
Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis-An Ethical Critique, REGULATION, Jan./Feb.
1981, at 33; cf. Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 100 S. Ct. 2844, 2866 (plurality), 2875 n. 1 (Powell, J.), 2883 (Rehnquist, J.);
American Textile Manufacturers v. U.S. Dept. Labor 49 U.S.L.W. 4720 (June 17,
1981) (Rehnquist, J.).
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pact. 00 Proponents of a regulatory budget argue that the overall impact of one agency on the whole economy, or of government as a
whole on one industry, should be subject to constraint, and that
such constraints will produce effective priority decisions. 10 Here the
problems of accounting become truly extraordinary; lawyers and
economists should rejoice in the professional opportunities they offer. Even assuming -these and other complexities of implementation
could be mastered, however, the question would also remain how
limits could rationally be assigned without having some notion of
the benefits to be foregone by the priority choices to be made.'0 2
The costs of the procedure itself have also to be considered. Any
regulatory budget will import its own special procedures. Periodic
budgeting and priority setting suggest a high degree of centralization and political control' 0 -a desirable outcome from my perspec0 "Various estimates on [the] total costs [of regulation] have been advanced-ranging from thirty billion to as much as one hundred and thirty billion.
With a range that wide, it is clear that no definite figures are currently available.
However, only a comparatively small fraction of the total (4.8 billion) represents the
budgets of the Federal Regulatory Agencies .... [T]he Business Roundtable's Cost of
Regulation Study ... considered costs, incurred by forty-eight major companies, to
comply with the regulations of six selected federal agencies during 1977. The six regulatory areas were: EPA, Equal Employment Opportunity, OSHA, DOE, ERISA, and
FTC. The study found that it costs those companies 2.6 billion to comply with those
agencies' regulations in a single year. EPA regulations were responsible for the lion's
share of those costs-some two billion dollars.
But direct compliance costs are still only part of the story. Various inefficiencies
can also occur from regulation .... Many of these effects of regulations are not now
well understood. We do not know the extent to which unnecessary rules of raised
production costs, reduced productivity, and aggravated inflation." S. REP. No. 961018, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 19-20 (1980).
101 Note 84 supra.
102 "On the positive side, the economic benefits of regulation is substantial.... For
example, air pollution benefits range from five to fifty-eight billion dollars annually.
Automobile safety controls saved over twenty-eight thousand lives in an eight-year
period-and seat belts alone reduced injuries by thirty-four percent and deaths by
twenty-eight percent." S. REP. No. 96-1018, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 20 (1980) citing
Center for Policy Alternatives, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Benefits of
Environmental, Health and Safety Regulation," prepared for the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 40 (March 1980).
103 S. 3550, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., for example, envisioned
an annual budget for
maximum allowable regulatory compliance costs prepared and submitted to the Congress by the President each year. Agency budgets would have to be submitted to the
President by November 10th preceding the fiscal year; the President would submit
the regulatory budget along with the fiscal budget, and the House and the Senate
would then conduct a review with action contemplated by September 15-a tenmonth period. The budget thus set would govern the agency's compliance activities
during the following fiscal year. See American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, Regulation and Regulatory Reform-A Survey of Proposals of the 95th
Congress, at 7-8 (1978); DeMuth, supra note 85.
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tive, but one that connotes very different procedural forms than now
accompany rulemaking or adjudication. Will additional resources be
provided to accomplish this new function? That will again mean
larger government, not smaller government; and diffusion not concentration of effort. As important, timely completion of the new
functions may be incompatable with continued use of accustomed
procedures-for example, judicial review. The -appropriations process seems especially inappropriate for the episodic and time-consuming processes of review. Unless we are prepared in adopting new
procedural forms to give up, or at least pare down, some now familiar controls over regulation, we will continue to make government
less and less efficient at even those tasks we can agree it is important for government to do.
Let us now briefly consider the third area that could be described
as regulatory reform, procedural reform. Here, interesting proposals
have been made concerning hybrid procedures for licensing and
ratemaking, subpoena reform changing the terms on which Administrative Law judges hold office, and a variety of other similarly difficult subjects which all seem ripe for legislative consideration. These
subjects could not be thoroughly treated without unduly extending
what has already been an overlong presentation. Let me spend a few
moments on only one topic, the development and complexification
of rulemaking as an administrative technique. 1 4
Only sixty-six years ago, Mr. Justice Holmes remarked in his pungently aphoristic way that "where a rule of conduct applies to more
than a few people it is impracticable that every one should have a
direct voice in its adoption .... Their rights are protected in the
only way they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule. ' ' 10 5 As a constitutional
matter, only political controls were available to the citizen who faced
a rulemaker acting within its authority. Thirty-three years ago, half
that distance away, Congress gave citizens somewhat greater procedural protections when it put into place a very simple rulemaking
process in the then new federal Administrative Procedure Act;106
one would now have the chance to know that rulemaking was being
considered; the opportunity to submit written commentary; and the
possibility of judicial review on the limited basis also available for
the review of statutes.1 0 7 By this time, doubts about the propriety of
104 For excellent, recent general surveys, see DeLong, supra note 14; Gifford,
Rulemaking and Rulemaking Review: Struggling Toward a New Paradigm,32 AD.L.
R.v. 577 (1980).
'05 Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
5 U.S.C. § 553.
107

E.g., Hoving Corp. v. FTC, 290 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1961).
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giving rulemaking authority to administrative agencies had come
and gone. Within government, the process could be bureaucratically
complex; a proposed policy might have to clear many desks. 08 As a
public procedure, however, rulemaking was extraordinarily simple
and undemanding; yet that simple procedure was regarded as "one
of the most significant jurisprudential inventions of this century."109
Rulemaking and rulemaking review are no longer simple. They
now dominate administrative law courses in which they would
barely have been mentioned ten years ago. As the financial and social impacts of some rulemaking have become apparent, lower courts
have moved steadily away from Justice Holmes' insistence that the
Constitution remits the citizen to political controls.110 The possibility of constraints on congressional delegation of rulemaking authority is reappearing as a respectable subject of discussion. 1 Today's
courts write of the notice and comment procedure as if that much,
at least, were constitutionally required for fairness, and intimate a
great deal more."" It may be unfair if the notice does not identify
the possible rule with some precision;118 if the agency relies on studies or other information not shown to participants in time for their
response;
if the agency has conversations with outsiders that are
not made public with an opportunity for response;11 5 or if the agency

108 See Pedersen, supra note 7; Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and other Sources
of Law in an Executive Department: Reflections on the Interior Department's Administration of the Mining Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1245-47 (1974).
100 The remark was attributed to professor Kenneth Culp Davis in Williams, Fifty
Years of the Law of the Federal Administrative Agencies-and Beyond, 29 FED.
BAR. J. 267, 270 (1970).
11 E.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977); Association of National Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
See Rogers, Judicial Review of Risk Assessment: The Role of Decision Theory
and Unscrambling the Benzine Decision, 11 ENVT'L L. 301 (1981), discussing Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980);
Am. Textile Manufacturers v. U.S. Dept. Labor, 49 U.S.L.W. 4726 (June 6, 1981).
I" E.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (record of outside contacts), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Association of National Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d
1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (objectivity of decisionmaker).
"I Wagner Electric v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1972).
11, Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckleshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
"I Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
Conversations with official outsiders may present a special case, but even there the
call for publicity if facts are conveyed in the contact is substantial. See Sierra Club v.
Costle, F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States Workers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex parte Contacts by the
White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1980); ACUS Recommendation 80-6, 45 Fed.
Reg. 86407 (12/13/80).
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fails to describe its reasoning process in some detail, answering all
significant comments and showing how it resolves disputes over social fact which underlie the outcome.11 On review, judges no longer
assume there exists a state of fact supporting agency decision unless
it can be proved otherwise; they take a "hard look" at what is an
extraordinarily expanded and comprehensive record of rulemaking
to determine whether that decision has substantial support.117 In all
of this they are encouraged by recent statutes and scholarly
commentary. 118
In my judgment, the next ten years will see a consolidation of
these trends. The Supreme Court's decision in the Vermont Yankee"" case three years ago made it evident that this consolidation is
to be worked out in Congress rather than in the courts. Legislation
enacted to date, however, unfortunately but one could also say typi120
cally, has been directed at rulemaking by individual agencies.
"Unfortunately," because in setting an individual agency's procedures, Congress seems especially vulnerable to the introduction of
procedural complexity as a compromise over disapproval on the
merits of an agency's charge. The great strength of the APA, as the
Court recognized in Vermont Yankee, lies in its independence from
these substantive concerns; the APA enacted procedural formulas
"upon which opposing social and political forces have come to
rest."' For any consolidation to be freg of the distortions introduced by approval or disapproval of particular legislative programs,
it must occur in a similar way, across the board.
What can be anticipated as the content of any such reform? Relatively uncontroversial proposals in the last Congress would have de-

United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
Id.; Industrial Union Dept. AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475-76 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); GELLHORN, BYSE & STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 343-350.
"' See, e.g., Section 6(f) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §
655(f); Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat.
374, 15 U.S.C. § 57(a); DeLong, supra note 14; Gifford, supra note 104; Rogers, A
Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEo.
L.J. 699 (1970); Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking:Lessons from the
Clean Air Act, 62 IowA L. REv. 713 (1977); Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. Rav. 258, 317-19 (1978).
"1 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Steadman v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 49
U.S.L.W. 4174 (Feb. 25, 1981) (reemphasizes the Supreme Court's view that the
APA's procedural judgments are to be regarded as determinative by courts, absent
intervening, different congressional judgments).
116
11

110

See Verkuil, supra note 118, at 317-19.

11 435

25, 1981).

U.S. at 523-24, 545-48. See also Steadman v. SEC, 49 U.S.L.W. 4174 (Feb.
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fined the rulemaking record much more fully than current law, and
imposed an obligation on agencies to place factual material on which
they might rely into that record in time for comment by participants.'2 2 The three major draft bills were agreed that for major
23
rulemaking, some form of impact analysis was to be performed.1
The statutory requirement that the agency explain its decision
would be expanded beyond the current "concise general statement"
to a statement which explains factual and legal reasoning in some
2 4
detail, and responds to every significant comment."
Other possibilities under consideration relate to limitations on the
decision process the agency may employ and external controls once
it has made its decision. The rulemaking procedure itself might be
extended by requiring provision for a second round of responsive
comments; and other procedures, including oral hearings where factual data was sharply in dispute, may be encouraged if not required.'25 Limits might be placed on off-record communication from

112

Section 201 of H.R. 3263, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) would have amended 5

U.S.C. § 553, in part, to read as follows: "(f) beginning no later than the date on
which an agency provides notice of a proposed rule, the agency shall maintain a file of
each rulemaking proceeding conducted pursuant to this section. The files shall
include(1) the notice of proposed rulemaking and any supplemental notice concerning
the rulemaking;
(2) copies of, or identification of, all studies and documentary material upon
which the agency substantially relied in formulating the proposed or final rules;
(3) the copies of all written comments on the proposed rule or area of inquiry
which was submitted pursuant to any agency notice of the proposed rulemaking
published for the Federal Register;
(4) all material which the agency by statute is required to make public in connection with the rulemaking or which the agency wishes to make part of the
record; and
(5) statements required by agency in formulating the rule."
Similar provisions were present in the two major Senate bills, and are carried foward
in the currently pending measures. See note 29 supra.
113 Id.
Title I; see S. REP. No. 96-1018, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) pts. 1 and 2;
note 29 supra.
124 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), as proposed to be amended by H.R. 3263, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980), would have read in part: "The [concise general statement of the basis and
purpose of the rule] shall include a response to the significant issues raised by the
comments concerning the proposed rule received by the agency during the public
comment period." Similar provisions were present in both of the Senate bills. And see
the current proposed bills at note 29 supra.
...Thus, H.R. 3263, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), would have provided that for major rules (those which require regulatory analysis) "the agency shall provide interested persons a period of not less than sixty days to submit written data, views, or
arguments concerning the preliminary regulatory analysis . . .the agency shall also
provide an additional period of not less than twenty days for interested persons to
submit responses to the written data, views or arguments submitted during the initial
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outsiders, perhaps including other government officials. 2 Staff
deeply involved in the proposal for rulemaking and in any presentations made to support it might be restrained as well.1 27 On judicial
review, the court might be instructed to look hard at the asserted

authority for a rule, and to find it ultra vires unless that. authority
clearly appeared; any findings would require substantial support in

the newly defined rulemaking file, viewed as a whole. 128 Judges were

comment period." 5 U.S.C. § 602(c), as proposed in Sec. 101(a). And the Senate Judiciary Committee version of S. 262 would have provided that in rulemaking involving
a "major rule, the agency shall, in addition to any procedure that may be required by
law, use such oral or written procedures as the agency determines are appropriate for
resolution of significant controversies over a material fact in dispute." A number of
suggested procedures were set forth, and a very restrictive standard of judicial review
provided. See 5 U.S.C. § 626, as prposed, S. REP. No. 96-1018, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. pt.
2, at 149. S. 262, as it would have been proposed by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, would have permitted but not required the use of additional
rulemaking procedures, and left "the decision of an agency to invoke, or not to invoke, any [such] procedures . . . [to] the sole and unreviewable discretion of such
agency." 5 U.S.C. § 607, as proposed, S. REP. No. 96-1018, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1,
at 171. Similar variety characterizes pending bill. See note 29 supra.
126 See Verkuil, note 115 supra and ACUS Recommendation 80-6, 45 Fed. Reg.
86407 (Dec. 13, 1980).
127 See Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252,
94 Stat. 374, § 57a(j,k).
128 The text describes the evolved form of the so-called "Bumpers" amendment,
thus, Sec. 207 of H.R. 3263, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) would have amended 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 to read as follows:
Scope of Review
(a) To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall independently decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning of or applicability of
the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion or otherwise not
in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or
immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,
or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure require by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a proceeding subject
to section 554 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an
agency hearing provided by statute;
(F) without substantial support in the rulemaking file, viewed
as a whole, for the asserted or necessary factual basis of a rule
adopted in a proceeding subject to section 553 of this title; or
(G) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
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not to enforce the new impact statement procedure-that was left to

the political branches-but the statement once produced was to be
part of the rulemaking file, for whatever weight it might add on review of the merits. 10 Finally, a general proposal for legislative veto
was floated; if adopted, every rule would have to be submitted to
Congress for its consideration, and possible disapproval in one or

both houses. 8 0

In my judgment, most of the changes in internal agency proce-

dures would likely prove sound-although it bears repeating that
they will also prove expensive in time, manpower, and dollars. On
matters of importance the probable improvements to accuracy of de-

cision and perceived fairness offered by fuller notice and participatory right, or by forced consideration of the impacts of decision, outweigh these harms. Holmes' aphorism is apt enough in
considering the Congress or a local body, where political controls are
immediate and strong; he is far less persuasive in describing a setting where the citizen's power is as remote as it is in the case of the
EPA or any other government agency.
In my judgment, we need to pause much more thoughtfully over
the equation when the issue is changing the agency's decisional style
or reducing the President's political controls over its actions or when
the rulemaking is routine in character. Cutting the agency off from

its own staff, or from the guidance which can be given by the rest of
executive government, invites larger inefficiencies, and mistakes the
character of the judgments being made. For the Nuclear Regulatory

(b) In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole
record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the
rule of prejuducial error.
(c) In making determinationsunder clause (2) (c) of subsection (a) of this section, the court shall require that action by the agency is within the scope of
agency jurisdiction or authority on the basis of the language of the statute or,
in the event of ambiguity, other evidence of ascertainablelegislative intent. In
making determinations on other questions of law, as distinguished from questions of fact or discretion, under this section, the court shall not accord any
presumption in favor of or against agency action.
Similar requirements have been imposed by President Reagan in his Executive Order
12291, Sec. 4, and are proposed in the pending legislation, note 29 supra.
I" E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 604, as proposed to be added by Sec. 101 of H.R. 3263, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
130 E.g., Sec. 201(b) of H.R. 3263, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), would have created a
procedure by which Congress had the opportunity to enact a joint resolution (subject
to presidential veto) prior to the effective date of any "major rule"-one having a
defined substantial impact on the economy. This is perhaps the most restrained of
legislative veto proposals-in fact, not a legislative veto, as it permits presidential
participation in the process. For a recent, general discussion see the article cited, note
20 supra.
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Commission to adopt a sensible rule about control room design, it
must have access to knowledgeable staff, and access which is informal and prompt-as decisions are taken and not in the complexities
of a testimonial setting. Unless the Commission is to create two independent and equally expert staffs, a truly wasteful procedure, that
means leaving it free to speak with the staff which may have drafted
the rule. The institutional decisional process, as this is called, certainly is not the process observed by judges; but it is universally the
process employed by corporate officials and others in positions of
importance when significant policy choices are to be made."'1 We
could abandon it at only at substantial cost to the accuracy and efficiency of rulemaking decision.
Similar arguments, recently developed compellingly by Paul
Verkuil, 32 support continued acceptance of an informal presidential
voice in rulemaking. Individual agencies are near-sighted. They administer a limited set of policies, without necessary appreciation for
possible clashes with other policies being administered elsewhere in
the government or for the general direction being given national affairs. Presidential intervention can serve as a corrective for these deficiencies. And presidential resources are severely limited. To encumber his office with the formalities of public participation is, in an
important sense, to deny his appointed role in constitutional government; and, again, to invite much larger inefficiencies and inaccuracies in government functioning.
Obviously these are summary arguments to which you can imagine strongly negative responses. The staff proposing rulemaking is
biased, it is argued; permitting the President to speak off the record
is opening the back door to political influence.'8 8 These are important objections. They echo attitudes of distrust of integrity which
have been particularly evident since the days of Watergate. Yet
here, in my judgment, Holmes' words still have some bite. If the
issue is integrity, then the citizen's claim to control is better located
at the ballot box. Otherwise we seem to arrive at the proposition
131GELLHORN, BYSE & STRAUSS, supra note 3, at 772; Feller, Prospects for the Further Study of Federal Administrative Law, 47 YALE L.J. 647, 662-63 (1938); Gifford,
The Morgan Cases: A Retrospective View, 30 AD. L. REv. 237, 256-57, 259 (1978); cf.
National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 491 F.2d 1141, 1145-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974). For recent signs of judicial acceptance of institutional decision see United Steelworkers of America v. U.S. Dep.t Labor, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
'" Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1980). See also COMMISSION ON THE LAW AND THE ECONOMY,
FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM, ch. 5 (1979).
"

See the dissenting statements of Elliott Bredhoff and William Coleman, Jr., in

FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM, at 144 and 155.

1981]

REGULATORY REFORM

that only government in the mold of the judiciary can be
trusted-and, frankly, my instincts run in the opposite direction.
Piling on safeguards, on the judicial model, will produce larger government, more costly and less efficient. And, in this case, to no significant gain.""
Legislative veto and the proper intensity of judicial review are
themselves subjects for a full lecture, and this discussion has already
been extended. Let me say this, expressing again what has in some
respects been a theme of this afternoon's remarks. An expanded
congressional role or the intensification of review will no more be
cost free than regulation itself. Time will have to be taken to engage
in new preparations, reducing to that extent the time available for
primary agency responsibility. Appropriated funds will be consumed, man-hours spent, attention diverted. As against the other
possible uses of these resources, what is to be gained? In the context
of all other control procedures already in place and the conclusion-which ought to be an independent conclusion-that the
agency's primary risk remains worth doing, what is the unique contribution which this procedure makes, and at what risk? Complexity
in government is not, or ought to be, an end in itself; as a disguise
for hostility to particular programs it is ultimately destructive of
good government as well.
Applying the insights of impact analysis to regulatory reform itself might be a step to controlling the size of government without
impairing its ability to wrestle with those evils which, on a contemporary judgment, remain its proper charge.

"" Accord, Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

